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THE QUALITATIVE THESIS*
This paper is about:
The Qualitative Thesis. If you are not sure that ¬ϕ, then you
are sure of the indicative conditional ϕ > ψ just in case you are
sure of the material conditional ϕ ⊃ ψ.
The Qualitative Thesis occupies a central place in contemporary theo-
ries of indicative conditionals. In §1 of this paper, we will show that the
Qualitative Thesis follows from widely-accepted principles about how
we should reason with indicative conditionals.
In the rest of the paper, we explore the consequences of the Qualita-
tive Thesis for the semantics of indicative conditionals. Specifically, we
will argue that the Qualitative Thesis provides two new and compelling
reasons to accept a thesis that we call Conditional Locality. Roughly,
Conditional Locality says that the interpretation of an indicative con-
ditional depends not just on the global context—the context of the
conversation—but also on the conditional’s local embedding environ-
ment. On this view, the contribution that the indicative conditional, if
Matt is in London, then he is in Oxford, makes to the meaning of (1) is
not the same as the contribution it makes to the meaning of (2).
(1) Alice is sure that if Matt is not in London, then he is in Oxford.
(2) Milo is sure that if Matt is not in London, then he is in Oxford.
Here is how the paper will proceed. In §1, we motivate the Qualitative
Thesis by showing that it follows from widely-accepted principles. In
§2, we introduce what we call the Local Qualitative Thesis. We take this
to be the weakest plausible precisification of the Qualitative Thesis.
The Local Qualitative Thesis is a context-sensitive version of the the
Qualitative Thesis. It says if the speaker of a context leaves open ϕ,
then she is sure of the material conditional ϕ ⊃ ψ just in case she is
sure of the proposition expressed by the indicative conditional ϕ > ψ
in her context.
*The authors are listed in alphabetical order and made equal contributions to this
paper. Thanks to Justin Bledin, Sam Carter, Lucas Champollion, Cian Dorr, Kevin Dorst,
Simon Goldstein, Justin Khoo, Harvey Lederman, Bernhard Salow, Una Stojnić and an
anonymous reviewer for helpful feedback. We are especially grateful to Ben Holguín
and Matthew Mandelkern for numerous helpful conversations and comments on earlier
drafts.
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In §3-§4, we present an argument—due to Ben Holguín—showing
that, without Conditional Locality, the Local Qualitative Thesis is in
tension with a plausible margin for error principle on rational sureness.1
However, as we show in §5-§6, if we accept Conditional Locality, it is
possible to reconcile the Qualitative Thesis and the margin for error
principle. This is our first argument for Conditional Locality.
In §6, we develop a theory of indicative conditionals, which we call
the Local, Shifty Theory of indicatives. Our theory respects Conditional
Locality. We give a selection semantics for the indicative conditional, ac-
cording to which ϕ > ψ is true just in case ψ is true in the selected
ϕ-worlds. But importantly, the selection function is partly determined
by the local linguistic environment of the conditional. As a result, the
contribution of the indicative conditional, If Matt is not in London, then
he’s in Oxford to (1) diers from its contribution to (2). We show that
this gives the Local, Shifty theory the resources to validate the Local
Qualitative Thesis while also accepting a margin for error constraint
on rational sureness.
In §7, we turn to our second argument for Conditional Locality. We
begin with the observation that the Local Qualitative Thesis is simply
too weak—the full range of data supports what we call the Strong Quali-
tative Thesis. Specifically, we will show that the Local Qualitative Thesis
does not predict that the following inference valid.
(1) Alice is sure that Matt is either in London or Oxford.
(3) So, Alice is sure that if Matt is not London, then he is in Oxford.
The Strong Qualitative Thesis, by contrast, does predict that the infer-
ence from (1) to (3) is valid. Since this inference does indeed seem valid,
this gives us strong reason to adopt the Strong Qualitative Thesis. We
argue that, without Conditional Locality the Strong Qualitative The-
sis has unacceptable trivializing consequences. But with Conditional
Locality, the Strong Qualitative Thesis is tenable.
i. motivating the qualitative thesis
In this section we present two arguments for the Qualitative Thesis.
The first argument is that the Qualitative Thesis follows from the
conjunction of two plausible claims about reasoning with conditionals.
The first claim is that Modus Ponens is valid. This entails one half of
the Qualitative Thesis—if you are sure of the indicative conditional
ϕ > ψ, then you are sure of the corresponding material conditional
1Ben Holguín, “Indicative Conditionals Without Iterative Epistemology,” Noûs, lv, 3
(September 2021): 560-80.
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ϕ ⊃ ψ (regardless of whether you are sure of ¬ϕ). The second claim is
that Stalnaker’s Direct Argument is a reasonable inference. This entails
the second half of the Qualitative Thesis, namely, that if you are not
sure that ¬ϕ and you’re sure of the material conditional ϕ ⊃ ψ, then
you are also sure of the indicative conditional ϕ > ψ.
Modus Ponens is the principle that from an indicative conditional
ϕ > ψ, together with its antecedent ϕ, one can infer the conditional’s
consequent ψ. It goes without saying that there are strong reasons to ac-
cept Modus Ponens.2Assuming a classical consequence relation, Modus
Ponens stands or falls with the principle that from an indicative condi-
tional ϕ > ψ, one can infer the material conditional ϕ ⊃ ψ. And if this
principle is valid, then one half of the Qualitative Thesis is true: if you
are sure of the indicative conditional ϕ > ψ, then you are also sure of
the material conditional ϕ ⊃ ψ.
The Direct Argument is the argument from the disjunction ϕ∨ψ to
the indicative conditional ¬ϕ > ψ. The argument is compelling, as the
following example shows.
(4) Matt is either in Los Angeles or London.
(5) So, if Matt is not in Los Angeles, he is in London.
We should not say that the Direct Argument is a classically valid in-
ference. For (4) is equivalent to the material conditional Matt’s not in
Los Angeles ⊃ Matt’s in London. So to say that (4) classically entails (5)
would be to say that the material conditional entails the indicative con-
ditional, a notoriously unacceptable consequence. Following Stalnaker,
we should instead say that Direct Argument is a reasonable inference—
roughly, if you are sure of the disjunction ϕ∨ψ, and are not sure that ϕ,
then you are sure that ¬ϕ > ψ.3 This claim is equivalent to the second
half of the Qualitative Thesis: if you are sure of the material conditional
ϕ ⊃ ψ and you are not sure that ¬ϕ, then you are sure of the indicative
conditional ϕ > ψ.4
2This is not to say that the principle is entirely uncontroversial; see footnote 20 for a
discussion of purported counterexamples.
3See Robert Stalnaker, “Indicative Conditionals,” Philosophia, v, 3 (1975): 269-86.
4Note that it doesn’t follow from the Qualitative Thesis that whenever the you are sure
of (4), you are in position to infer (5). You might be sure of (4) without leaving open
that Matt is in Los Angeles, and the Qualitative Thesis is silent about that case. But, as
Stalnaker points out, it is felicitous to assert (4) only if the context leaves open that Matt
is not in Los Angeles, and so whenever (4) is felicitously asserted, the posterior context
will entail that Matt is in Los Angeles or London, but leave open that Matt is in Los
Angeles. This means that The Qualitative Thesis predicts that the speakers can infer (5)
from (4) whenever they have become sure of (4) on the basis of a successful assertion of
(4).
4 the journal of philosophy
The second argument for The Qualitative Thesis is that, given plau-
sible assumptions, it follows from Stalnaker’s Thesis, stated informally
below.
Stalnaker’s Thesis. The probability of ϕ > ψ is equal to the
probability of ψ conditional on ϕ whenever the probability of ϕ
is greater than zero.
The case for Stalnaker’s Thesis is strong. To see this, take an exam-
ple. You are holding a standard 52-card deck of cards, and you draw
one at random. Ask yourself how confident you are in the following
conditional.
(6) The selected card is a jack if it’s a red card.
If you are like most, you will judge the probability of (6) to be 1/13: there
are 26 red cards, and 2 of them are jacks. 1/13 is also the probability
that the selected card is a jack given that it is red. That is exactly what
Stalnaker’s Thesis predicts; and it is easy to multiply examples like
this. In general, we calculate the probability of a conditional ϕ > ψ by
calculating the probability of ψ conditional on ϕ.
If we assume that one is sure of some proposition just in case one
assigns credence 1 to that proposition, then Stalnaker’s Thesis entails
The Qualitative Thesis. To see why, suppose Stalnaker’s Thesis is true.
If Stalnaker’s Thesis is true, so is the following corollary of Stalnaker’s
Thesis.
The Probability 1 Thesis. If P (ϕ) > 0, then P (ϕ > ψ) = 1 if
and only if P (ψ|ϕ) = 1
It can be easily checked that if P (ϕ) > 0, then P (ϕ ⊃ ψ) = 1 if and only
if P (ψ|ϕ) = 1. So The Probability 1 Thesis entails (7).
(7) If P (ϕ) > 0, then P (ϕ > ψ) = 1 if and only if P (ϕ ⊃ ψ) = 1
If being sure is having credence one, then (7) is equivalent to the Qual-
itative Thesis.
In this section, we have explained why one should care about the
Qualitative Thesis. The first argument is that the Qualitative Thesis
follows from the conjunction of two standard claims about indicative
conditionals—the claim that Modus Ponens is valid, and the claim that
the Direct Argument is a reasonable inference, respectively. The second
argument is that, given a plausible probabilistic account of being sure,
the Qualitative Thesis follows from Stalnaker’s Thesis.
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ii. the local qualitative thesis
Here is how we stated The Qualitative Thesis in the introduction.
The Qualitative Thesis. If you are not sure that ¬ϕ, then you
are sure of the indicative conditional ϕ > ψ just in case you are
sure of the material conditional ϕ ⊃ ψ.
There are dierent ways to make this informal thesis more precise—
some stronger, some weaker. In the first part of this paper, we focus
on what we take to be the weakest plausible precisification, which, we
think, all theorists about conditionals should want to accept. We call
this thesis The Local Qualitative Thesis.
The Local Qualitative Thesis is inspired by Andrew Bacon’s defense
of a context-sensitive version of Stalnaker’s Thesis.5 Bacon argues that
Stalnaker’s Thesis is in tension with contextualism about indicative con-
ditionals. To see why, assume ϕ and ψ are not context-sensitive expres-
sions. According to contextualists, there are still many propositions cor-
responding to the sentence ϕ > ψ, since the proposition expressed by
an indicative can vary from context to context.6 There will be contexts
c1 and c2 such that ~ϕ > ψc1 , the proposition expressed by an utter-
ance of the conditional in c1, is distinct from ~ϕ > ψc2 , the proposition
expressed in c2. Stalnaker’s Thesis says that the probability of each of
these propositions is equal to the probability of ψ given ϕ. It follows that
the probability of ~ϕ > ψc1 is equal to the probability of ~ϕ > ψc2 . But
the contextualist cannot accept this consequence. For the contextualist,
~ϕ > ψc1 and ~ϕ > ψc2 are simply dierent propositions and so the
attitude one takes to the first may be very dierent from the attitude
one takes to the second.
Bacon advances a thesis that is similar to Stalnaker’s Thesis, but
one that is friendly to contextualist accounts of indicatives. Before we
state this thesis, it will be helpful to say something about the specific
form of contextualism at issue. Contextualists say that indicative con-
ditionals are information sensitive. They talk about what’s true in an-
tecedent worlds compatible with a contextually-determined body of in-
formation. The version of Stalnaker’s Thesis that Bacon endorses takes
5Andrew Bacon, “Stalnaker’s Thesis in Context,” Review of Symbolic Logic, viii, 1
(September 2014):131-63.
6Henceforth, we will use Greek letters for variables ranging over sentences; so, for
example, the variable ϕ takes a sentence as its value. We will use bold upper case Romans
for variables ranging over sets of worlds (i.e. propositions); so, for example,A takes a set
of worlds as its value. ~ϕc will denote the proposition expressed by ϕ in context c. We
will be loose with use and mention when it comes to the connectives: the accompanying
variables will make clear whether, for example, ⊃ picks out an expression or the material
conditional operator.
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this information-sensitivity into account. It says, roughly, that if the to-
tal evidence available to the speaker in a given context is E, then the
probability that she assigns to ~ϕ > ψcE—the proposition expressed by
the indicative conditional in her context, relative to her information—is
equal to the probability that she assign to ψ conditional on ϕ.
Bacon and other contextualists will want to take the same strategy
with respect to the Qualitative Thesis. They will endorse a contextualist
version of the Qualitative Thesis, which says, roughly, that you are sure
of the proposition expressed by the indicative conditional relative to
your information just in case you are sure of the corresponding material
conditional. To state this thesis, we introduce a new operator to talk
about what the speaker in a given context is sure of. Let S c,w(~ψc)
mean that the speakers in c are sure that ~ψc in w. Here is the Local
Qualitative Thesis.
The Local Qualitative Thesis. For any world w and context c,
if ¬S c,w(~¬ϕc), then: S c,w(~ϕ > ψc) if and only if S c,w~ϕ ⊃ ψc .
This says: if the speaker in c is sure of ~¬ϕc , then she is sure of ~ϕ >
ψc just in case she is sure of the material conditional ~ϕ ⊃ ψc . Note
that, for the sake of brevity, we will often refer to the Local Qualitative
Thesis simply as ‘The Qualitative Thesis’.
We think that everyone, contextualist or not, should endorse the Lo-
cal Qualitative Thesis. Contextualists should accept it for the reason
Bacon gives. If ~ϕ > ψc1 and ~ϕ > ψc2 are distinct propositions, then
the attitude one takes to the first need not be the same as the attitude
one takes to the second. And for non-contextualists, the Local Quali-
tative Thesis is simply a roundabout way of saying what the original
Qualitative Thesis did. For these theorists, the proposition expressed
conditional expresses does not depend on the context, so the indicative
conditional expresses the same thing relative to one body of informa-
tion as it does relative to any other body of information.
iii. the qualitative thesis in the standard framework
Here we present a standard formal framework for thinking about The
Qualitative Thesis. This framework gives sureness ascriptions a Hin-
tikka semantics. And it gives the conditional a variably strict seman-
tics, where ϕ > ψ says, roughly, that ψ is true in the closest ϕ-worlds.78
7 In Appendix A.2, we prove that analogous results hold in a strict conditional frame-
work, where ϕ > ψ says that ϕ ⊃ ψ holds throughout some fixed set of closest worlds.
8See Robert Stalnaker, “A Theory of Conditionals," in Nicholas Rescher, ed., Studies in
Logical Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1968): pp. 98-112. See also David Lewis, Counterfactuals
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1973).
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We characterize the Qualitative Thesis in this framework and then use
this result to show that the Qualitative Thesis puts a significant con-
straint on the logic of sureness, entailing a principle we call No Opposite
Materials.
III.1. A Standard Framework.We begin by constructing a propositional
modal language that we can use to describe what a subject is sure of.
The set of sentences of the language L is the set of sentences generated
by the following grammar:
• ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | ϕ > ψ | Sϕ
The propositional connectives ⊃, ≡, and ∨ are defined as usual; > is
our conditional operator. We read Sϕ as the subject is sure of ϕ.
Next, the interpretation of the language. We assume that we are in
some fixed arbitrary context with some relevant speaker who deter-
mines the particular interpretation of the conditional; that is, our se-
mantic evaluation function, ~·, specifies only the content of the sen-
tences in our language in this context.
We interpret the logical connectives in the standard way. To give the
truth-conditions of the conditional, we use a selection function, which we
assume is supplied by the background context. Where f (A,w) is the
set of selected A-worlds at w and ~ϕ = {w : ~ϕw = 1}, we say:
StandardVariably Strict Semantics. ~ϕ > ψw= 1 i f (w,~ϕ) ⊆
~ψ
This clause says that ϕ > ψ is true at a world w just in case all of
the selected ϕ-worlds at w are ψ-worlds. We stipulate that the selection
function has the following natural properties:
Success. f (w,A) ⊆ A
Minimality. If w ∈ A, then w ∈ f (w,A)
Non-Vacuity. If R(w) ∩A , ∅ then f (w,A) , ∅
Success and Minimality are standard assumptions. Success says that
the selected A-worlds at w must be A-worlds. Minimality says that if
w is an A-world, then it must be among the selected A-worlds at w;
it’s needed to validate Modus Ponens. Non-Vacuity says that if there
are accessible A-worlds at w, then the set of selected A-worlds at w
isn’t empty. Non-Vacuity is needed to validate a form of Conditional
Non-Contradiction, specifically:
Weak Conditional Non-Contradiction. ¬S¬ϕ ⊃ ¬((ϕ > ψ)∧
(ϕ > ¬ψ))
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Weak Conditional Non-Contradiction says that if ϕ is a live possibility,
then ϕ > ψ and ϕ > ¬ψ are not consistent. This is a standard—and
desirable—principle in conditional logic.9 In general, there is some-
thing very wrong with asserting both ϕ > ψ and ϕ > ¬ψ.
Truth for the sureness operator S is defined in terms of an accessibil-
ity relation R: wRw′ means that w′ is compatible with what the subject
is sure of in w.10




We assume only that R is serial: at every world the subject has consistent
beliefs. We assume that the accessibility relation R is that of the relevant
agent in the arbitrary context we interpret our language in.
Given how we understand the interpretation of our language, we can
characterize the Local Qualitative Thesis by characterizing the follow-
ing object language principle:
QT. ¬S¬ϕ ⊃ (S(ϕ > ψ) ≡ S(ϕ ⊃ ψ))
Our interpretation of the language forces us to understand QT locally—
specifically, as saying that if the speaker of a given context c leaves open
~ϕ, then she is sure of the proposition expressed by ϕ > ψ relative to
the information in her context just in case she is sure of ~ϕ ⊃ ψ.
III.2. Characterizing the Qualitative Thesis. We will now characterize
QT and derive from it an important constraint on the accessibility re-
lation. Consider Stalnaker’s Indicative Constraint:
Indicative Constraint. If R(w)∩A , ∅, then if w′ ∈ R(w), then
f (w′,A) ⊆ R(w).11
The Indicative Constraint says that if A is left open, then the selected
A-worlds at any accessible world are themselves accessible worlds.
More precisely, if A is compatible with what the speaker is sure of
in a world w, then for any world w′ that is compatible with what the
speaker is sure of in w, the selected A-worlds at w′ are a subset of the
worlds compatible with what the subject is sure of at w.
9Why not a stronger version of Conditional Non-Contradiction that just says ϕ > ψ
and ϕ > ¬ψ are not consistent? This stronger principle is inconsistent with Logical
Implication, which says that ϕ > ψ is always true when ϕ entails ψ. Weak Conditional
Non-Contradiction, by contrast, is consistent with Logical Implication.
10We use the term doxastic accessibility to mean compatibility with what the subject is
sure of, not what she believes.
11See Robert Stalnaker, “Indicative Conditionals,” Philosophia, op. cit..
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In Appendix A.1, we prove that the Indicative Constraint character-
izes QT.12
Fact 1. QT is valid on a normal variably strict frame F just in
case F meets the Indicative Constraint.
We can use Fact 1 to show that the Qualitative Thesis has important
epistemological upshots. Consider:
No Opposite Materials. For any two worlds w1, w2, if there’s
some w3 such that w1Rw3 and w2Rw3, then, for any A ⊆ W : if
R(w1) ∩A , ∅, R(w2) ∩A , ∅ and R(w3) ∩A , ∅, then there’s
no C ⊆W such that R(w1) ⊆ A ⊃ C and R(w2) ⊆ A ⊃ ¬C.
No Opposite Materials says that for certain pairs of worlds, and certain
propositions A, you can’t be sure of a material conditional A ⊃ C at
the first world and sure of the ‘opposite’ material conditional,A ⊃ ¬C,
at the second. Which pairs of worlds? Any two worlds that see a world
in common. And for which propositions? Any proposition that is con-
sistent with what you’re sure of at all three worlds.
One can easily show that that No Opposite Materials is a conse-
quence of QT. Specifically:
Fact 2. A normal variably strict frame F validates QT only if
No Opposite Materials holds on F .
We can give an informal explanation of why this holds. If No Opposite
Materials fails we are left with a situation like below:
w1 w3 w2
R(w1) R(w3) R(w2)
12The numbering of the facts here corresponds to that in the appendices.
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There must be some w1 and some w2 such that both w1 and w2 see
some w3. And all three worlds must see worlds where some proposition
A is true. In the diagram above, the pink region above represents A.
Finally, for some C, A ⊃ C is true throughout R(w1) and A ⊃ ¬C is
true throughout R(w2). This is secured in the diagram above by letting
C, the shaded region, coincide with R(w1). We can now show that QT
must fail at either w1 and w2. For suppose it held at both. Since ¬S¬A
and S(A ⊃ C) are true at w1, S(A > C) must be too and so A > C is
true at all worlds seen by w1. For similar reasons, S(A ⊃ ¬C) must be
true at w2 and so A > ¬C is true at all worlds seen by w2. But w3 is
seen by both; so it follows that both A > C and A > ¬C are true at
w3. But this contradicts Weak Conditional Non-Contradiction.
In the next section we develop an argument due to Ben Holguín show-
ing that No Opposite Materials is inconsistent with a plausible margin
for error requirement on rational sureness.13 Fact 2 tells us that QT
entails No Opposite Materials. It follows that QT is itself inconsistent
with the margin for error requirement.
iv. no opposite materials and margin for error principles
To illustrate the margin for error requirement, we begin with a case
from Timothy Williamson.14 Mr. Magoo is staring out the window at
a tree some distance o, wondering how tall it is. Assuming his only
sources of information are reflection and present perception of the tree,
what should he believe? That depends on how tall the tree actually is.
If the tree is 100 inches tall, Mr. Magoo’s visual information rules out
possibilities in which the tree is 200 inches tall, or so we can imagine.
So it would be reasonable for Magoo to be sure that the tree is not 200
inches tall. On the other hand, Magoo’s visual information does not
rule out possibilities in which the tree is 101 inches tall; his eyesight is
simply nowhere near that good. It would not be reasonable for Magoo
to be sure that the tree is not 101 inches tall.
Mr. Magoo’s beliefs about the height of the tree are rational only if
they leave a margin for error.15 If the tree is n inches tall, a belief that
13See Holguín, “Indicative Conditionals Without Iterative Epistemology,” op. cit.. Note
that Holguín draws a very dierent moral from his argument, concluding that if you
accept the margin for error principle you should reject The Qualitative Thesis. We think
these can be reconciled.
14Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and its Limits (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2000).
15We will often use the term ‘belief’ because neither ‘surety’ nor ‘sureness’ sounds
quite right (and ‘surenessess’ is even worse). But when we say ‘Magoo’s belief’ we should
be understood as talking about the state of being sure; and when we talk about ‘Magoo’s
belief set’ we should be understood as talking about the set of worlds compatible with
what Magoo is sure of.
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the tree is not n+1 inches tall does not leave a suciently wide margin
for error; that belief is false in nearby worlds where the tree is slightly
taller. On the other hand, a belief that the tree is not n+100 inches tall
does leave a suciently wide margin for error; that is true in nearby
worlds where the tree is a bit taller.
To state the margin for error requirement, we introduce a margin
for error frame 〈W ,R〉. W is a set of worlds representing possible tree
heights. Where i is the height in inches of the tree in w,W = {wi : i ∈ R
and i > 0}. R is a binary doxastic accessibility relation on W : wiRwj
means that, in a world where the tree is i inches tall, it is compatible
with everything Magoo is rationally sure of that the tree is j inches
tall. R is defined as follows, relative to an arbitrarily chosen positive
constant h.
Magoo’s Margin. wiRwj if and only if |j − i| < h.
h is Magoo’s margin for error; h is positive, for otherwise his discrimi-
nation would be perfect.
No Opposite Materials fails on every margin for error frame. To see
this, suppose that h = 10, and consider three worlds in W : w100, w108,
and w116. Here is a diagram depicting Mr. Magoo’s beliefs in these three
worlds.
w108 w116w100
Mr. Magoo’s belief worlds at w116 overlap with his belief worlds at
w100:w108 is consistent with what he is sure of inw116 and consistent with
what he is sure of in w100. Moreover, it’s consistent with what Magoo
is sure of at each world that the tree is either 100 inches tall or 116
inches tall. This means that the antecedent of No Opposite Materials is
satisfied. The right and left worlds see a world in common, w108. And
the proposition that the tree is either 100 inches tall or 116 inches tall
is consistent with what Magoo is sure of at all three worlds. But the
consequent of No Opposite Materials is not satisfied. Since Magoo’s
margin for error is 10, w100 does not see w116 and w116 does not see
w100. As a result, Mr. Magoo is sure of ‘opposite’ material conditionals
at w100 and w116. At w100, Mr. Magoo is sure that (8) is true; at w116,
Mr. Magoo is sure that (9) is true:
(8) (116 ∨ 100) ⊃ 100
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(9) (116 ∨ 100) ⊃ 116
This shows that No Opposite Materials fails on every margin for error
frame when h = 10. But the choice of 10 inches for h was arbitrary. It is
not hard to see that No Opposite Materials will fail on every margin for
error frame, regardless of the value of h.16 Any such frame will contain,
for some positive real number i, three worlds: wi, wi+ h2 , and wi− h2 .
wi wi+ h2wi− h2
The right and left worlds see a world in common, wi . The proposition
that the tree is either i + h2 inches tall or i −
h
2 inches tall is consistent
with what Magoo is sure of at each world. So the antecedent of No
Opposite Materials is satisfied. But the consequent is not. wi− h2 does
not see wi+ h2 and wi+ h2 does not see wi− h2 . This means that Mr. Magoo
is sure of ‘opposite’ material conditionals at wi− h2 and wi+ h2 . At wi− h2 ,
Magoo is sure of (10) and at wi+ h2 he is sure of (11):
(10) ((i + h2 ) ∨ (i −
h
2 )) ⊃ (i −
h
2 )
(11) ((i + h2 ) ∨ (i −
h
2 )) ⊃ (i +
h
2 )
16 In Timothy Williamson, “Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic,” Inquiry, lvi, 1 (2013):
1-14, more complex frames are used to model the margin for error requirement. These
frames treat worlds as ordered pairs 〈j , k〉, where j is the real height of the tree and k is
the apparent height of the tree. Williamson defines R as follows: 〈j , k〉R〈j′, k′〉 just in case
(1) k = k′ and (2) |j′ − k| ≤ |j − k| + h. These frames validate No Opposite Materials.
However, we think that this is merely an artifact of Williamson’s simplifying assumption
that appearances are luminous, which proponents of margin for requirements should
ultimately reject: (1) says that one world sees another only if the apparent height of the
tree is the same in the two worlds. If we replace (1) with a constraint (1′), which says that
〈j , k〉R〈j′, k′〉 only if |k′ − k| ≤ c, for some positive constant c, No Opposite Materials will
no longer be valid. To see this, suppose c = 6 and h = 10. Then 〈108, 108〉 and 〈114, 114〉
see each other, and 〈108, 108〉 and 〈102, 102〉 see each other, but 〈102, 102〉 does not
see 〈114, 114〉 and 〈114, 114〉 does not see 〈102, 102〉. In this model, the antecedent of
No Opposite Materials is satisfied: 〈102, 102〉 and 〈114, 114〉 see a world in common,
namely 〈108, 108〉. And the proposition that the tree is either 102 inches tall or 114 inches
tall is consistent with what Magoo is sure of at all three worlds. But the consequent
of No Opposite Materials is not satisfied. At 〈102, 102〉, Magoo is sure of the material
conditional (102 ∨ 114) ⊃ 102; at 〈114, 114〉, Magoo is sure of the ‘opposite’ material
conditional (102 ∨ 114) ⊃ 114. Thanks to Simon Goldstein and Bernhard Salow for
discussion.
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v. enriching the framework
In §4 we showed that The Qualitative Thesis entails No Opposite Ma-
terials in the standard variably strict framework. In §5 we showed that
if we accept a margin-for-error requirement on rational sureness, we
must reject No Opposite Materials. Putting these two things together,
we conclude that if we accept the margin for error principle, we must
reject The Qualitative Thesis.
We want to take a moment to explain the tension between No Oppo-
site Materials and The Qualitative Thesis in a less formal, and hope-
fully more intuitive, way. Recall our three-world partial model of Mr.
Magoo’s sureness state. Call this model Williamson’s Tree.
w108 w116w100
Consider the proposition that the tree is either 100 inches tall or 116
inches tall (100 ∨ 116). At w100, Magoo is sure that (8) is true, and at
w116 Magoo is sure that (9) is true.
(8) (100 ∨ 116) ⊃ 100
(9) (100 ∨ 116) ⊃ 116
Suppose The Qualitative Thesis holds at both w100 and w116. Then
Magoo is sure of the indicative conditionals (12) and (13) at w100 and
w116, respectively.
(12) (100 ∨ 116) > 100
(13) (100 ∨ 116) > 116
Remember that w108 is consistent with what Magoo is sure of at w100
and it is consistent with what he is sure of at w116. So, (12) and (13)
are both true at w108. This is where we run into trouble. If (12) is true
at w108, the the selected (100 ∨ 116)-worlds at w108 must be a subset
of {w100}. If (13) it true at w108, the selected (100 ∨ 116)-worlds at w108
must be a subset of {w116}.
But the selection function cannot meet both of these demands. The
set of selected (100 ∨ 116)-worlds at w108 can be a subset of {w100} and
{w116} only if there are no selected (100 ∨ 116)-worlds at w108. But that
would violate Non-Vacuity, which says that if an antecedent ϕ is dox-
astically possible at w, then the set of selected ϕ-worlds at w is not
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empty. We know that (100∨ 116) is consistent with what Magoo is sure
of w108: w108 sees w100 and w116. So, by Non-Vacuity, the set of selected
(100 ∨ 116)-worlds at w108 is not empty.
In models that violate No Opposite Materials, The Qualitative The-
sis places inconsistent demands on the selection function. Putting the
problem this way suggests a solution. Instead of just one selection func-
tion, which we use to evaluate an indicative relative to just any belief
state, we have multiple selection functions, indexed to dierent belief
states. This will allow us to validate The Qualitative Thesis in mod-
els like Williamson’s Tree. Instead of placing incompatible demands on
one selection function, we place dierent demands on dierent selec-
tion functions. The selection function indexed to Magoo’s belief state at
w100 will satisfy a version of the Indicative Constraint stated in terms of
Magoo’s belief worlds at w100. The selection function indexed to what
Magoo is sure of at w116 will satisfy a version of the Indicative Con-
straint stated in terms of Magoo’s belief worlds at w116.
vi. local contexts and shifty selection functions
In this section, we develop the idea just sketched by making the con-
ditional’s contribution sensitive to its local context. We say that when a
conditional occurs under an attitude verb, the conditional is evaluated
relative to the local context introduced by the attitude verb. We validate
The Qualitative Thesis using a version of the Indicative Constraint. But
importantly, our account is not subject to the problem of conflicting de-
mands. That is because the selection function used to interpret the
conditional is indexed to the conditional’s local context. When the lo-
cal context changes, the selection function does, too. In the rest of this
section, we develop our theory. In §7.1, we say more about what local
contexts are, describing how they have been used in theories of pre-
supposition and epistemic modality. In §7.2, we present our account:
the local, shifty theory. In §7.3, we show how the theory validates The
Qualitative Thesis while escaping the problem of conflicting demands.
VI.1. What are Local Contexts? Here’s a standard idea. The interpre-
tation of a sentence at a certain point in a conversation depends on
the common commitments of the speakers at that point in the conver-
sation. Starting in the early 1970s, theorists noticed that a sentence’s
local informational environment can also influence its interpretation.
Specifically, how we interpret an expression in a sentence is partly de-
termined by the information contained in the rest of the sentence.17
The phenomenon of presupposition projection provides an illustration of
17See Robert Stalnaker, “Pragmatic Presuppositions,” in Munitz, M. K. and Unger, P.,
eds, Semantics and Philosophy (New York: New York University Press, 1974): pp. 197-213.
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this. Much contemporary research starts from the idea that a presup-
position must be satisfied in the context in which it is uttered. But this
won’t do if by ‘context’ we mean the global context—the context of the
conversation—modeled by a set of worlds representing the common
commitments of the speakers. For consider (14):
(14) If Suzie used to smoke, she stopped smoking.
The consequent of (14) presupposes that Suzie used to smoke. But (14)
can be felicitously uttered even when the speakers don’t know that she
used to smoke. This shows that the presupposition of the consequent of
(14) need not be satisfied by the global context representing the com-
mon commitments of the speakers; instead, it only has to be satisfied
relative to a kind of local context that also includes information present
in the sentence but not in the global context — here that being the
antecedent of the conditional, that Suzie used to smoke.
The notion of a local context has been taken up both by both dynamic
and static approaches to meaning. In a dynamic semantics, the semantic
value of a sentence is its context change potential, that is, the information
it tends to add to the context. Formally, the meaning of a sentence is
taken to be a function from a set of worlds to another set of worlds.
Dynamic semantics oers a particular way to understand what a local
context is. Roughly, we can think of the local context for a clause within
a sentence as the context which that clause updates in the course of
performing the update of the sentence as a whole. But local contexts
are also intelligible on a static approach to meaning. Philippe Schlenker
has developed a theory of local contexts in a static framework:18 the
local context for an expression is just whatever information would be
redundant, if it were explicitly added to the embedding environment.
The notion of a local context has also been put to work in the seman-
tics of epistemic modals. In particular, they have been used to explain
the infelicity, both unembedded and embedded, of epistemic contradic-
tions, sentences like:19
(15) # It’s raining and it might not be raining.
See also Lauri Kartunnen, “Presupposition and Linguistic Context,” Theoretical Linguis-
tics, i, 1 (1974): 181-194. Finally, see Irene Heim, The Semantics of Denite and Indenite
Noun Phrases, PhD diss., University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 1982.
18See Philippe Schlenker, “Local Contexts,” Semantics and Pragmatics, ii, 3 (2009): 1
-78.
19See Seth Yalcin, “Epistemic Modals,” Mind, cxvi, 464 (November 2007): 983-1026.
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Epistemic contradictions are invariably defective. A natural explana-
tion is that the epistemic modal conjunct takes for granted the informa-
tion in its local context: (15) sounds bad because the local context for
it might not be raining already entails that it is raining.20
This thought has been implemented in both traditions for thinking
about local contexts. The dynamic approach to epistemic modality, de-
fended by Veltman and Gillies among others, favors a test semantics for
epistemic modals.21 On this view, epistemic might tests whether its lo-
cal context is consistent with its prejacent. This correctly predicts that
epistemic contradictions are marked both outside and inside of em-
beddings. A similar idea has been developed within static frameworks.
For example, Seth Yalcin’s domain semantics adds an information state
parameter to the index and stipulates that this parameter shifts under
attitudes in much the way that Schlenker’s local contexts do.22 Matthew
Mandelkern’s bounded theory of epistemic modality draws an even tighter
connection between epistemic modals and local contexts, arguing that
the domain of quantification for an epistemic modal is determined by
the modal’s local context.23 More specifically, Mandelkern claims that
an epistemic modal must be interpreted relative to a modal base that
takes any world w to a subset of the modal’s local context. This con-
straint, which Mandelkern calls the Locality Constraint, accounts for the
infelicity of epistemic contradictions, embedded and unembedded.
We will follow this precedent of employing local contexts in the se-
mantics for epistemic vocabulary and advocate for the following thesis:
Conditional Locality. The semantic contribution of a condi-
tional under an attitude is determined by the local context sup-
plied by the attitude.
Our first argument for this thesis will be that it resolves the tension
between the Qualitative Thesis and margin for error principles. We
will outline a static implementation of Conditional Locality that takes
its cue from Mandelkern’s approach to epistemic modals: we add to the
index a local context parameter—a set of worlds representing the local
20This high-level description doesn’t exactly capture what’s going on with all theories
employing something like the notion of a local context. Still, we think it is fair to say that
this accurately characterizes a wide range of views.
21See Frank Veltman, “Defaults in Update Semantics,” Journal of Philosophical Logic,
xxv, 3 ( June 1996): 221-61. Compare Anthony Gillies, “On the Truth-Conditions for If
(but Not Quite Only If ),” Philosophical Review, cxviii, 3 ( July 2009): 325-49.
22See Yalcin, “Epistemic Modals,” op. cit.
23See Matthew Mandelkern, “Bounded Modality,” The Philosophical Review, cxxviii,
1 ( January 2019): 1-61.
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context—that shifts under embedding operators in the way Schlenker’s
algorithm predicts. Notice that Mandelkern’s Locality Constraint bears
a close similarity to the Indicative Constraint. The dierence is that
the Indicative Constraint is stated in terms of the global context—the
set of worlds compatible with what the speakers believe—whereas the
Locality Constraint is stated in terms of local contexts. In the next
section, we propose to modify the Indicative Constraint so that it bears
an even closer similarity to Mandelkern’s Locality Constraint. However,
we should emphasise that Conditional Locality is equally compatible
with a dynamic approach to conditionals. We suspect similar results
can be achieved by combining a test semantics for conditionals with a
standard dynamic semantics for attitudes.24
VI.2. The Localized Indicative Contraint and Shifty Selection Functions.
We will assume a variably strict theory of the indicative conditional.
Where κ is the conditional’s local context, here’s our semantic entry.
Local, Shifty Variably Strict Semantics. ~ϕ > ψκ,w = 1 if
and only if: ∀w′ ∈ fκ(w, ~ϕκ) : ~ψκ,w
′
= 1
The Local, Shifty Variably Strict Semantics is similar to the Stan-
dard Variably Strict Semantics. The dierence is that there is a new
parameter—a local context parameter—and the selection function is
indexed to that parameter.25 Since selection functions are indexed to
24We think it is worth showing how to achieve the goals of this paper in a static and
classical variably strict framework and do not intend to argue at length here for this view
over dynamic accounts. However, we will note one dierence between the accounts. They
dier over the validity of Or-to-if, which we formulate with an epistemic modal ^ as:
Or-to-if. ^¬ϕ,ϕ ∨ ψ |= ¬ϕ > ψ
Dynamic accounts validate Or-to-if because they use non-classical consequence relations.
Since we use a classical consequence relation, we do not validate or-to-if. (However, we
can account for the reliability of Or-to-if reasoning using Stalnaker’s notion of reasonable
inference.)
We are inclined to think our account is right to invalidate Or-to-if. Or-to-if is not prob-
abilistically valid: it is easy to create counterexamples by focusing on cases where ~ϕ by
itself accounts for most of the probability of ~ϕ∨ψ. If one is inclined to think, as we do,
that valid inferences should preserve probability, then this feature of our account favors
it over dynamic and informational theories. Thanks to Sam Carter and an anonymous
referee for discussion.
25 In this statement, the variably strict conditional does not shift the local context for
the consequent. However, it is generally accepted in the literature on presupposition that
the local context for the consequent of the consequent includes the information in the
antecedent. To reflect this, we could modify the entry in the text as follows:
Local, Fully Shifty Variably Strict Semantics. ~ϕ > ψκ,w = 1 if and only if:
∀w′ ∈ fκ(w, ~ϕκ) : ~ψκ∩~ϕ
κ ,w′ = 1
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local contexts, we can impose constraints on selection functions that
make reference to local contexts. We propose to replace Stalnaker’s In-
dicative Constraint with the following Localized Indicative Constraint:26
Localized Indicative Constraint. If A ∩ κ , ∅, then ∀w′ ∈ κ:
fκ(w′,A) ⊆ κ
The Localized Indicative Constraint tells us that the selected an-
tecedent worlds relative to a world w in the local context for the condi-
tional must be a subset of the local context (so long as the antecedent
is compatible with the local context).
With this new parameter, we restate the remaining constraints on the
selection function.
Success. fκ(w,A) ⊆ A
Minimality. If w ∈ A, then w ∈ fκ(w,A).
Non-Vacuity. If κ ∩A , ∅ then fκ(w,A) , ∅.
Success says that the selected A-worlds are a subset of A. Minimality
says that if w is an A-world, then w is one of the selected A-worlds at
w. We assume Success and Minimality for the same reasons as the stan-
dard framework does. Non-Vacuity says that if there are someA-worlds
in κ, then the set of selectedA-worlds at w is not empty. This constraint
guarantees a local version of Weak Conditional Non-Contradiction:
whenever there are ϕ-worlds in κ, at most one of ϕ > ψ and ϕ > ¬ψ
can be true at a point of evaluation 〈κ,w〉.
We said that selection functions are indexed to local contexts and
obey the Localized Indicative Constraint. The reason this matters, of
course, is that local contexts are shiftable. In particular, they can be
shifted by attitude predicates, such as believe, want, and, our focus in
this paper, is sure that. Following Schlenker, we assume that the local
context introduced by an attitude predicate like is sure that at a world
w is the set of worlds compatible with what the subject is sure of in
w.27 Where R is a doxastic accessibility relation representing what an
For simplicity, we stick with the formulation in the text. However, see footnote 23 for
further discussion of the above entry.
26MatthewMandelkern has independently developed a version of the Localized Indica-
tive Constraint. See Matthew Mandelkern, “If p, then p!,” forthcoming in this Journal.
There are important dierences between our constraint and Mandelkern’s, however. The
main dierence is that Mandelkern’s constraint is stated as a definedness condition on
the interpretation of the conditional, whereas our constraint is stated as a constraint on
the selection function.
27See Philippe Schlenker, “Local Contexts,” op. cit.
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arbitrary subject is sure of and R(w) is the set of worlds compatible
with what that subject is sure of in w:




Shifty Hintikka Semantics treats ‘is sure that’ as a necessity operator,
just as the standard Hintikka semantics does. But now we’ve added a
new parameter, a local context parameter, to the index. Shifty Hintikka
Semantics says that attitude operators shift this parameter to R(w), the
set of worlds compatible with what the subject is sure of in w. This
means that when we evaluate an attitude ascription like pMagoo is sure
thatϕ > ψq at a worldw, we evaluate the embedded conditional relative
to Magoo’s belief state at w. As we show in the next section, this is
exactly what we need to validate The Qualitative Thesis without falling
prey to the problem of conflicting demands.
VI.3. Local, Shifty Indicatives and The Qualitative Thesis. We leave the
proof to Appendix B, but here’s an informal explanation of why QT,
repeated below, is valid on our account.
QT. ¬S¬ϕ ⊃ (S(ϕ ⊃ ψ) ≡ S(ϕ > ψ))
It will be useful to divide the thesis into two theses and take them in
turn.
Indicative-to-Material. ¬S¬ϕ ⊃ (S(ϕ > ψ) ⊃ S(ϕ ⊃ ψ))
Material-to-Indicative. ¬S¬ϕ ⊃ (S(ϕ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ S(ϕ > ψ))
Begin with Indicative-to-Material. Suppose that, in an arbitrary world
w, you are not sure of ¬ϕ and you are sure of the indicative ϕ > ψ.
Consider an arbitrary world w′ that is compatible with what you are
sure of in w. We know that ϕ > ψ is true at w′. To show that ϕ ⊃ ψ is
true at w′, suppose that ϕ is true at w′. Minimality tells us that if ϕ is
true in w′, then w′ is among the selected ϕ-worlds at w′. Since ϕ > ψ
is true at w′, it follows that ψ is true at w′. So, the material conditional
ϕ ⊃ ψ is true at w′. Since w′ was chosen arbitrarily, we conclude that
ϕ ⊃ ψ is true at every world compatible with what you are sure of in
w. You are sure of the material conditional ϕ ⊃ ψ in w.
Turn to Material-to-Indicative. Suppose that, in an arbitrary world
w, you are not sure of ¬ϕ and you are sure of the material conditional
ϕ ⊃ ψ. Consider an arbitrary world w′ that is compatible with what you
are sure of in w. We want to show that ϕ > ψ is true in w′. Since you are
not sure that ¬ϕ in w, the Localized Indicative Constraint tells us that
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selected all of the selected ϕ-worlds at w′, relative to your belief state in
w, are compatible with what you are sure of in w. Since you are sure of
the material conditional ϕ ⊃ ψ in w, all of these selected ϕ-worlds must
be ψ-worlds. It follows that ϕ > ψ is true at w′ relative to your belief
state in w. Since w′ was chosen arbitrarily, we conclude that ϕ > ψ is
true, relative to your belief belief state in w, at every world compatible
with what you are sure of in w. And that, according to Shifty Hintikka
Semantics, is just what it takes for you to be sure of ϕ > ψ in w.28
28Whether QT holds in full generality depends on whether we adopt the simplified
variably strict semantics in the main text or the entry in footnote 22. Given the latter, both
Indicative-to-Material and Material-to-Indicative fail for right-nested conditionals (though
they continue to hold for non-conditional antecedents and consequents). In both cases,
this is because the material does not shift the local context for the consequent while the
indicative does. For a model where Material-to-Indicative fails, consider the following:
R(w1) = {w1,w2};
V (p) = {w1}; V (q) = V (r) = {w2};
fR(w1)∩~pR(w1 ) (V (q),w) = {w1,w2}
Here ¬S¬p and S(p ⊃ (q > r)) are true at w1 but S(p > (q > r)) is false. (Note that
since there simply are no p ∧ q-worlds here, the constraints on the selection function are
satisfied vacuously.) For a model where Indicative-to-Material fails, consider:
R(w1) = {w1,w2,w3};
V (p) = {w2,w3}; V (q) = {w2,w3}; V (r) = {w3};
fR(w1)(V (q),w1) = {w3}; fR(w1)∩~pR(w1 ) (V (q),w1) = {w2}.
Here ¬S¬p and S(p > (q > r)) are true at w1 but S(p ⊃ (q > r)) is false.
However, we are in fact inclined to endorse the counterexamples to QT in both di-
rections. To turn the above into an intuitive counterexample to Indicative-to-Material,
consider the following situation. We don’t know whether Alice came to the party. We
know that Alice came i Billy did not. And we know that either Billy didn’t come or
Carol did too. Here you should be sure that if Billy came, then so did Carol. So, since
you are sure of the right disjunct, you should be sure that
(16) Either Alice didn’t come or if Billy came then so did Carol.
However, it does not sound true to say:
(17) If Alice came, then if Billy came then Carol came.
After all if Alice came then we know Billy didn’t. (Perhaps this example is be best treated
as involving a presupposition failure by adding a presupposition that the local context
contains some antecedent worlds; but (17) certainly should not be predicted to be true.)
For a counterexample to Material-to-Indicative, consider the following situation. Imag-
ine I take a normal pack of cards and remove the Jack of Clubs. You must now remove
the top card from the deck. Here the following seems true:
(18) If the top card is black, then if the top card is a jack, it’s the Jack of Spades.
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That concludes our informal explanation of why The Qualitative
Thesis is valid. The last thing to do is explain why we do not fall prey to
the problem of conflicting demands in models where No Opposite Mate-
rials fails. So that we have everything in front of us, here is Williamson’s
Tree again.
w108 w116w100
Magoo is sure of the material conditional (8) in w100 and he is sure of
the material conditional (9) in w116.
(8) (100 ∨ 116) ⊃ 100
(9) (100 ∨ 116) ⊃ 116
In the standard variably strict framework, there is no way to guarantee
that The Qualitative Thesis holds at both w100 and w116 without placing
conflicting demands on the selection function at the overlap world w108.
To secure The Qualitative Thesis w100, the selected (100 ∨ 116)-worlds
at w108 must be a subset of {w100}; otherwise (100∨116) > 100 would be
false at w108, and so Magoo would not be sure of it at w100. To secure
The Qualitative Thesis at w116, the selected (100 ∨ 116)-worlds at w108
must be a subset of {w116}; otherwise (100 ∨ 116) > 116 would be false
at w108 Magoo would not be sure of it at w116. The selection function
cannot meet both of these demands on pain of violating Non-Vacuity.
On the other hand, the following strikes us as dubious.
(19) Either the top card is not red (i.e. non-black), or if the top card is a jack, it’s the
Jack of Spades.
It’s not obvious to us in assessing the right disjunct we hold fixed that the top card is
black.
There is one further complication here. We have been assuming that the material con-
ditional is paraphrasable in terms of disjunction. But many in the literature on presupposi-
tion think that in a disjunction the local context for the right disjunct is the negation of the
left disjunct. If so, then, assuming the standard truth-table for the material conditional,
ϕ ⊃ ψ will not in general be equivalent to ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ); in particular the equivalence will
fail in cases where the right disjunct is a conditional. This would make it more dicult to
evaluate the empirical consequences of our prediction that QT fails for embedded condi-
tionals, as these are usually assessed by considering the equivalent disjunction. (Though
note that the truth of (19) above seems to push against treating disjunction this way.)
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In the Local, Shifty framework, by contrast, dierent belief states
correspond to dierent selection functions. When we evaluate an in-
dicative conditional relative to Magoo’s belief state at w116, we use one
selection function; when we evaluate a conditional relative to his belief
state at w100, we use a dierent selection function. Consider (20) and
(21):
(20) ~Magoo is sure that: 100 ∨ 116 > 100κ
(21) ~Magoo is sure that: 100 ∨ 116 > 116κ
Where R is an accessibility relation representing Magoo’s beliefs, (20)
is true at w100 just in case (22) is true at every world in R(w100): w100
and w108. (21) is true at w116 just in case (23) is true at every world in
R(w116) : w108 and w116.
(22) ~(100 ∨ 116) > 100R(w100)
(23) ~(100 ∨ 116) > 116R(w116)
But (22) and (23) do not place incompatible demands on the selection
function at the overlap worldw108. (22) is true atw108 only if the selected
(100 ∨ 116)-world at w108, relative to Magoo’s belief state at w100, is w100,
whereas (23) is true at w108 only if the selected (100∨116)-world at w108,
relative to Magoo’s belief state at w116, is w116. These are simply dierent
demands on dierent selection functions, so there is no inconsistency.
vii. the strong qualitative thesis
At the start of this paper we said that we would give two arguments
for Conditional Locality. We have completed the first argument: with-
out Conditional Locality, any plausible precisification of the Qualita-
tive Thesis will have unwelcome epistemological consequences. Now
we move to our second argument. We will argue that the correct pre-
cisification must be stronger than the Local Qualitative Thesis. In this
section, we introduce what we call the Strong Qualitative Thesis.We then
show that, without Conditional Locality, the Strong Qualitative Thesis
has unacceptable, trivializing consequences. But with Conditional Lo-
cality, it is tenable.
VII.1. Motivating The Strong Qualitative Thesis. Recall the Local Qual-
itative Thesis, which we stated and characterised in the first half of the
paper:
The Local Qualitative Thesis. For any world w and context c,
if ¬S c,w(~¬ϕc), then: S c,w(~ϕ > ψc) if and only if S c,w~ϕ ⊃ ψc .
To see why this thesis is too weak, let’s look at an example. Suppose
I’m wondering where Matt is, and you have reason to believe that Alice
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knows. You check with Alice and report back that Alice is sure that
Matt is either in Los Angeles or London, but she’s not sure which. So
(24) is true in my context.
(24) Alice is sure that Matt is either in Los Angeles or London, but
she’s not sure which.
From (24), I infer (25).
(25) So, Alice is sure that if Matt is not in Los Angeles, he’s in
London.
The inference is reasonable, nay obligatory: if I accept (24), I must also
accept (25). Observe that (26) seems to attribute to Alice an incoherent
state of mind:
(26) # Alice is sure that Matt is either in Los Angeles or London, but
she’s not sure that he’s in London if he’s not in Los Angeles.
Just as you can’t accept ϕ ∨ ψ while denying ¬ϕ > ψ, you can’t coher-
ently describe others as accepting ϕ ∨ ψ while denying ¬ϕ > ψ.
But that is not what the Local Qualitative Thesis predicts. Suppose
that I am the speaker in context c, the context relative to which we are
interpreting our conditional operator >. Then the Local Qualitative
Thesis says that if I am sure that Matt is either in Los Angeles or Lon-
don, and I’m not sure that Matt is not in Los Angeles, then I am sure of
the conditional expressed by if Matt is not in Los Angeles, he’s in London
relative to my information. But the Local Qualitative Thesis does not
predict that (25) follows from (24) in my context. If we want to predict
that (25) follows from (24), we need a version of the Qualitative Thesis
that applies to any attitude operator in our language, one that applies
to all subjects, regardless of what context they’re in, or what informa-
tion they have. To state such a thesis, we enrich our language from §4.
Where A is a finite set of names, we add the operator S s to our lan-
guage, for each s ∈ A. S sϕ says that s is sure that ϕ; or more precisely,
where Rs is an accessibility relation representing what s is sure of, we
have:
Generalized Standard Hintikka Semantics. ~S sϕc,w = 1 i
∀w′ ∈ Rs(w) : ~ϕc,w
′
= 1
This allows us to state the Strong QT, which says that for any s, the
following holds:
Strong QT. ¬S s¬ϕ ⊃ (S s(ϕ ⊃ ψ) ≡ S s(ϕ > ψ))
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The Strong QT goes beyond the Local Qualitative Thesis in just the
way we wanted: sentences like (26) are incoherent.
VII.2. Strong QT without Conditional Locality.We’ve introduced Strong
QT and argued that it is desirable. Now we argue that in the standard
framework, Strong QT is untenable because it has trivialising conse-
quences.
First compare what Local QT and Strong QT require of the standard
framework. Local QT requires coordination between the speaker’s ma-
terial conditional beliefs and their beliefs in their own conditional (i.e.
what the indicative expresses in their context). Strong QT requires far
more than this: it requires coordination between any given person’s mate-
rial conditional beliefs and their beliefs about the speaker’s conditional.
Even seen at this high level, we should expect trouble. Each instance
of the Strong QT will require that there is coordination between the
speaker’s selection function for the conditional and the relevant agent’s
doxastic state. But even within a single world, dierent people will be
sure of lots of dierent, perhaps conflicting, things. If there is enough
divergence in what dierent people are sure of, it is hard to see how
Strong QT could hold in a sensible way — it would require the same
conditional to be coordinated with too many diverging doxastic states.
We make this worry precise in the form of a triviality result. Here
is what we show. Assuming sureness is probability 1, one particular
consequence of Strong QT is the following:
The Global Probability 1 Thesis. For any subject s, context
c, and world w: if Ps,w(~ϕc) > 0, then Ps,w(~ψc |~ϕc) = 1 i
Ps,w(~ϕ > ψc) = 1
This says that, when they assign ϕ non-zero probability, anyone should
have probability 1 in the speaker’s conditional ϕ > ψ just in case they
give ψ probability 1, conditional on ϕ. We then prove that the Global
Probability 1 Thesis entails:
Triviality. Any subject who assigns positive probability to ~ϕc
conditional on ~ψc and positive probability to the conditional
~ϕ > ψc is certain of ~¬ψc conditional on ~¬(ϕ > ψ)c .
But this result is absurd. Suppose I am not sure whether it is raining
out or not. And I’m not sure whether we will have a picnic if it is sunny
out. I should not become sure that there will be no picnic if I simply
learn that it is not the case that if it’s sunny out, we’re having a picnic; I can
learn the conditional if it’s sunny out, we’re having a picnic is false and
still not know whether or not we are going to have a picnic. In general,
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when you learn the negation of a conditional you do not thereby learn
the negation of its consequent.
First, let’s derive the Global Probability 1 Thesis. We assume that
sureness is probability 1, or more precisely:
(27) Rs(w) ⊆ A i Ps,w(A) = 1
Given the Generalised Standard Hintikka Semantics, we can rewrite
this as the principle we call the Non-Shifty Link:
Non-Shifty Link. ~S sϕc,w = 1 i Ps,w(~ϕc) = 1
Now note that, as a matter of pure probability, when ~ϕc has posi-
tive probability, then ~ϕ ⊃ ψc has probability 1 just in case ~ψc has
probability 1, conditional on ~ϕc :
(28) If Ps,w(~ϕc) > 0, then Ps,w(~ϕ ⊃ ψc) = 1 i Ps,w(~ψc |~ϕc) =
1
Given this fact, the Non-Shifty Link and Strong QT straightforwardly
yield the Global Probability 1 Thesis.
Now let’s see why the Global Probability 1 Thesis entails Triviality.
Consider two subjects, s and s′. Suppose that the probability function of
s′ inw is s’s probability function inw conditionalized on ~ψc . Formally:
(29) Ps′,w = Ps,w(·|~ψc)
We make two assumptions: that s assigns positive probability to ~ϕc
conditional on ~ψc and that s assigns positive probability to ~ϕ > ψc .
Formally:
(30) Ps,w(~ϕc |~ψc) > 0.
(31) Ps,w(~ϕ > ψc) > 0
(29) and (30), together with the probability axioms, yield the following
facts:
(32) Ps′,w(~ϕc) = Ps,w(~ϕc |~ψc) > 0
(33) Ps′,w(~ψc) = Ps,w(~ψc |~ψc) = 1
Assuming the Global Probability 1 Thesis, (32) and (33) entail (34):
(34) Ps′,w(~ϕ > ψc) = Prs′,w(~ψc |~ϕc) = 1
But now remember that the probability function of s′ is the probability
function that results from conditionalizing s’s probability function on
~ψc . This means that (34) entails (35):
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(35) Ps,w(~ϕ > ψc |~ψc) = 1
And finally (31), (35), and the probability axioms give us (36).
(36) Ps,w(~¬ψc |~¬(ϕ > ψ)c) = 1
We have now derived our triviality result: any subject who assigns pos-
itive probability to ~ϕc conditional on ~ψc and positive probabil-
ity to the conditional ~ϕ > ψc is certain of ~¬ψc conditional on
~¬(ϕ > ψ)c .
A simple example showed us that this consequence is absurd. But
we can bring this into sharper relief by thinking about what a negated
conditional might mean. Some theorists say that negated indicatives
are the duals of negated indicative conditionals; that is, they think that
a negated conditional like:
(37) It’s not the case that if it rains, there will be a picnic.
is equivalent to:
(38) If it rains, there might not be a picnic.
Given our result above, this would have the consequence that upon
learning (38), you should become sure that there will not be a picnic.
This consequence is to be rejected.
Other theories subscribe to the principle of Conditional Excluded
Middle, which says that (ϕ > ψ)∨ (ψ > ¬ψ) is always true. Given Weak
Conditional Non-Contradiction, this means that when you leave open
ϕ, ¬(ϕ > ψ) and ϕ > ¬ψ are equivalent. So, on such a theory, (37) is
equivalent to:
(39) If it rains, there will not be a picnic.
Given our result above, this would have the consequence that upon
learning (39) you should become sure that there will not be a picnic.
Again, this consequence is to be rejected.
We claimed that adding the Strong QT to the standard framework
would spell trouble and we have now made good on our claim. Strong
QT forces coordination between the material conditional beliefs of var-
ious subjects and their beliefs in the speaker’s indicative conditional. As
wemight have expected from Lewis’s results, this trivialises the standard
framework. We need another option if we are to validate the Strong QT.
VII.3. Strong QT with Conditional Locality.We have argued that Strong
QT is untenable in the standard framework. With Conditional Locality,
on the other hand, Strong QT is tenable. In particular, it is valid and
non-trivializing in our Local, Shifty framework.
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To see why Strong QT is valid, it’s helpful to contrast the Indicative
Constraint and the Localized Indicative Constraints:
Indicative Constraint. If R(w)∩A , ∅, then if w′ ∈ R(w), then
f (w′,A) ⊆ R(w).
Localized Indicative Constraint. If A∩ κ , ∅, then if w′ ∈ κ:
fκ(w′,A) ⊆ κ
On the standard, non-shifty variably strict semantics, which does not
accept Conditional Locality, there is just one selection function. The
Indicative Constraint coordinates this selection function with a specic
accessibility relation—the accessibility relation relative to which we in-
terpret Sc , the attitude operator corresponding to the speaker of the
context. The selection function remains coordinated with that acces-
sibility relation even when the conditional is embedded under other
attitude operators that are interpreted relative to dierent accessibility
relations.
Suppose, for example, that I am the speaker in c. And suppose that
Alice, whose information diers from mine, is sure of the material con-
ditional ~ϕ ⊃ ψc . Does it follow that Alice is sure of the indicative
conditional ~ϕ > ψc? It doesn’t. Suppose there is some world w that
is compatible with what I am sure of and with what Alice is sure of.
By the Indicative Constraint, the selected ϕ-worlds at w are a subset
of the worlds compatible with what I am sure of, not the set of worlds
compatible with what Alice is sure of. If there are worlds compatible
with what I’m sure of where ~ϕc is true but ~ψc is not, then these
selected ϕ-worlds may not be ψ-worlds, and in that case, ~ϕ > ψc will
be false at w. Since w is compatible with what Alice is sure of, it follows
that Alice is not sure of the indicative conditional ~ϕ > ψc .
The Localized Indicative Constraint works dierently. It picks the
selected worlds from whatever the local context for the conditional is. More
precisely, if there are ϕ-worlds in the local context, then the selected
ϕ-worlds must be in the local context. The Shifty Hintikka Semantics
ensures that for any sureness operator Sx, the local context for a con-
ditional embedded under that operator is the set of worlds compatible
with what x is sure of in the world of evaluation. The interpretation of
the conditional is coordinated with the subject of the attitude clause.
The Shifty Hintikka Semantics and the Localized Indicative Constraint
combine to guarantee the validity of Strong QT. The precise explana-
tion proceeds in just the same way as the explanation of why QT is
valid given in §7.3.
Finally, turn to triviality. Without Conditional Locality, we are forced
to reject Strong QT or face trivialization. But if we accept Conditional
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Locality, and thus reject the Standard Hintikka Semantics in favor of
the Shifty Hintikka Semantics, Strong QT does not enforce the kind
of problematic coordination as it did in the standard framework. Com-
pare and contrast what the Strong QT requires of Alice and Billy in this
framework: it requires that Alice is sure of the proposition expressed by
ϕ > ψ relative to her information just in case she is sure of the corre-
sponding material; and that Billy is sure of the proposition expressed by
ϕ > ψ relative to his information just in case he is sure of the material
conditional. Their two conditionals will be dierent when they have
dierent information. The only coordination required by Strong QT
now is of a safer, more desirable kind, that between a person’s material
conditional beliefs and their beliefs in their own conditional.
Putting it another way, observe that the Shifty Hintikka Semantics
does not entail the Non-Shifty Link; instead, it entails the following
shifty link.
Shifty Link. ~S sϕc,κ,w = 1 i Ps,w(~ϕc,R(w)) = 1
The Shifty Link says that the sentence S sϕ is true in a context c just in
case s has probability 1 in the proposition expressed by ϕ relative to the
local context introduced by the attitude predicate.
To see why the Shifty Hintikka Semantics gives us the Shifty Link,
note that can rewrite the semantic entry as follows.
(40) ~S sϕc,κ,w = 1 if and only if: Rs(w) ⊆ ~ϕc,R(w)
We also assume that an agent assigns probability 1 to a proposition A
in a world w just in case the set of worlds compatible with what she is
sure of in w is a subset of A. We repeat this assumption below.
(21) Ps,w(A) = 1 i Rs(w) ⊆ A
The Shifty Link follows from (40) and (27). The Non-Shifty Link, on
the other hand, fails.29
29Here is a simple counterexample. Assume there are just three worlds: w1, where Matt
is in London; w2, where Matt is in Paris; and w3, where Matt is in Los Angeles. Suppose
w1 and w3 are compatible with what Billy is sure of in w3 and w2 and w3 are compatible
with what Alice is sure of in w3. Now take a context where Alice is the speaker; so the
global context for the conditional:
(41) If Matt isn’t in Los Angeles, he’s in London.
is what Alice is sure of. In other words, ~If Matt isn’t in Los Angeles, he’s in Londonc,κc
is the same proposition as ~If Matt isn’t in Los Angeles, he’s in Londonc,RAlice (w3). Billy
does not assign this conditional probability 1 at w3, for it is false at w3: this conditional
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The reason we avoid triviality is that the Shifty Link does not entail
the Global Probability 1 Thesis; instead, it entails the Local Probability
1 Thesis:
The Local Probability 1 Thesis. For any subject s, context c
and worldw: if Ps,w(~ϕc,Rs (w)) > 0, then Ps,w(~ψc,Rs (w)|~ϕc,Rs (w)) =
1 i Ps,w(~ϕ > ψc,Rs (w)) = 1
The Local Probability 1 Thesis is weaker than the Global Probabil-
ity 1 Thesis. It doesn’t say that just anyone must assign probability 1
to ~ϕ > ψc,Rs (w) just in case they assign probability 1 to ~ψc,Rs (w)
conditional on ~ϕc,Rs (w). It says that s must assign probability 1 to
~ϕ > ψc,Rs (w) just in case s assigns probability 1 to ~ψc,Rs (w) condi-
tional on ~ϕc,Rs (w). The equation holds only when the evidence de-
termining the probability function and the evidence determining the
interpretation of the conditional are identical.
This localization blocks the triviality result from earlier. Assume
again that Ps′,w is the probability function that results from condition-
alizing Ps,w on ~ψc and that ~ϕc and ~ψc are compatible relative to
Ps,w; that is, that s assigns positive probability to ~ϕc conditional on
~ψc .30 The Global Probability 1 Thesis entails that s′ has probability
1 in ~ϕ > ψc,Rs (w); that is, they assign probability 1 to what ϕ > ψ
expresses in s’s context. Since Ps′,w is Ps,w conditionalized on ~ψc , this
would allow us to conclude that s assigns probability 1 to their own
conditional ~ϕ > ψc,Rs (w) conditional on ~ψc ; which, in turn, would
mean that s was certain of ~¬ψc conditional on ~¬(ϕ > ψ)c,Rs (w). But
the Local Probability 1 Thesis does not have this consequence. That’s
because it does not require s′ to have probability 1 in s’s conditional,
~ϕ > ψc,Rs (w), in virtue of having probability 1 in ~ψc conditional on
~ϕc ; it only requires s′ to have probability 1 in her own conditional,
~ϕ > ψc,Rs′ (w), when she has probability 1 in ~ψc,Rs′ (w) conditional on
~ϕc,Rs′ (w). This means that s can have non-extreme credence in ~¬ψc
conditional on ~¬(ϕ > ψ)c,Rs (w).
is about what Alice is sure of; and at w3 Alice leaves open a world where Matt is in Paris,
not London. So we have
(42) PBilly,w3 (~If Matt isn’t in Los Angeles, he’s in London
c,κc ) , 1
But in all worlds compatible with what Billy is sure of and where Matt isn’t in Los Angeles,
he’s in Paris; so the following is true in c:
(43) Billy is sure that if Matt isn’t in Los Angeles, he’s in Paris.
30Note that, in the shifty framework, ~ϕc is ~ϕc,κc , where κc is the set of worlds
compatible with what the speaker in c is sure of.
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viii. conclusion
The Qualitative Thesis is a plausible thesis about the indicative con-
ditional: one direction is secured by Modus Ponens; the other by the
Direct Argument and Stalnaker’s Thesis. We gave two arguments that
Conditional Locality is necessary to fully vindicate the Qualitative The-
sis. First we argued that the weakest plausible precisification of the
Qualitative Thesis has problematic epistemological consequences in
standard frameworks: it is incompatible with the margin for error prin-
ciple, a plausible principle about the nature of rational sureness. Sec-
ond, we argued for a specific precisification of the Qualitative Thesis,
the Strong Qualitative Thesis, but showed that it trivialises in stan-
dard frameworks. We proposed the Local, Shifty theory of conditionals,
where the interpretation of a conditional is sensitive to its local con-
text, and we assumed that attitude operators shift that local context.
We showed that the resulting framework resolves both issues, allowing
it to fully vindicate the Qualitative Thesis.
appendix a. the qualitative thesis in standard frameworks
A.1. The Variably Strict Framework. Our language L is the smallest set
of sentences generated by the following grammar:
• ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | ϕ > ψ | Sϕ
A variably strict frame F is a tuple 〈W ,R, f 〉. W is a non-empty set of
worlds. R is a binary relation onW representing doxastic accessibility:
wRw′ means that w′ is compatible with what the subject is sure of in
w. f , the selection function, is a function from a world and a set of
worlds to a set of worlds and is used to interpret the conditional oper-
ator: f (A,w) is the set of selected A-worlds at w. We say that a normal
variably strict frame is any variably strict frame 〈W ,R, f 〉 such that f
obeys the following constraints.
Success. f (w,A) ⊆ A
Minimality. If w ∈ A, then w ∈ f (w,A)
Non-Vacuity. If R(w) ∩A , ∅ then f (w,A) , ∅
We interpret the language with a modelM = 〈F ,V 〉. F is a variably
strict frame and V a function from propositional variables to sets of
worlds. We recursively define truth at point in W :
~pw= 1 i w ∈ V (p)
~¬ϕw= 1 i ~ϕw= 0
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~ϕ ∧ ψw= 1 i ~ϕw=~ψw= 1
~ϕ > ψw= 1 i f (w,~ϕ) ⊆ ~ψ
~Sϕw = 1 i ∀w′ ∈ R(w) : ~ϕw
′
= 1
where ~ϕ = {w : ~ϕw = 1}.
Recall from section 4 our object language version of the The Quali-
tative Thesis:
QT ¬S¬ϕ ⊃ (S(ϕ > ψ) ≡ S(ϕ ⊃ ψ))
And recall:
Indicative Constraint. If R(w)∩A , ∅, then if w′ ∈ R(w), then
f (w′,A) ⊆ R(w).
Fact 1. QT is valid on a normal frame F i F meets the Indicative
Constraint.
Proof.⇐: We split QT into the following two principles and show that
both must be valid on F , if it meets the Indicative Constraint:
QT⇒ ¬S¬ϕ ⊃ (S(ϕ > ψ) ⊃ S(ϕ ⊃ ψ))
QT⇐ ¬S¬ϕ ⊃ (S(ϕ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ S(ϕ > ψ))
First we show QT⇒ cannot fail on a normal frame F . Suppose for
contradiction it did. Then, for some w, ~¬S¬ϕw = ~S(ϕ > ψ)w =





= 0. But, by Minimality, w′ ∈ f (~ϕ,w′). So ~ϕ > ψw
′
= 0 and
~S(ϕ > ψ)w = 0 after all; contradiction. So QT⇒ holds on any normal
frame; and in particular it holds on any normal frame that meets the
Indicative Constraint.
Now suppose that QT⇐ fails on F . Then, for some w, ~¬S¬ϕw =
~S(ϕ ⊃ ψ)w = 1 but ~S(ϕ > ψ)w = 0. So, for some w′ ∈ R(w),
~ϕ > ψw
′
= 0. So there is some w′′ such that w′′ ∈ f (~ϕ,w′) and
w′′ < ~ψ. So, by Success, w′′ < ~ϕ ⊃ ψ. But, since ~S(ϕ ⊃ ψ)w it
follows R(w) ⊆ ~ϕ ⊃ ψ. So w′′ < R(w); the Indicative Constraint fails.
⇒: Suppose that the Indicative Constraint does not hold onF . Then for
some A, there’s some w and w′ such that R(w)∩A , ∅, w′ ∈ R(w) but
f (A,w′) * R(w). So there’s some w′′ ∈ f (A,w) such that w′′ < R(w).
But now we can build a model where QT fails. Let V (p) = A and V (q) =
{w′′}. We can see that for all w′ ∈ R(w) ~p ⊃ ¬qw
′
= 1, as w′′ < R(w).
So ~S(p ⊃ q)w = 1. But ~p > qw
′
= 0, since w′′ ∈ f (~p,w′). But
w′ ∈ R(w), so ~S(p > q)w = 0. 
Now recall:
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No Opposite Materials. For any two worlds w1, w2, if there’s
some w3 such that w1Rw3 and w2Rw3, then, for any A ⊆ W : if
R(w1) ∩A , ∅, R(w2) ∩A , ∅ and R(w3) ∩A , ∅, then there’s
no C ⊆W such that R(w1) ⊆ A ⊃ C and R(w2) ⊆ A ⊃ ¬C.
Fact 2.QT is valid on a normal frame F only if F satisfies No Opposite
Materials.
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that on some normal frame F QT
holds but NoOpposite Materials does not. Then there arew1 w2,w3 and
A such that (i) R(w1)∩A , ∅, R(w2)∩A , ∅ and R(w3)∩A , ∅ but (ii)
for some C, R(w1) ⊆ A ⊃ C and R(w2) ⊆ A ⊃ ¬C. Since QT is valid
on F , F obeys the Indicative Constraint. This means that f (A,w3) ⊆
R(w1) and f (A,w3) ⊆ R(w2). So f (A,w3) ⊆ A ⊃ C and f (A,w3) ⊆
A⊃¬C. Given Success, this means f (A,w3) ⊆ C and f (A,w3) ⊆ ¬C.
But this can only happen if f (A,w3) = ∅. But this is already ruled out
by Non-Vacuity. Contradiction. 
A.2. The Qualitative Thesis in a Strict Framework. Our language L is
as before. A strict frame F for L is a tuple 〈W ,R, h〉.W is a non-empty
set of worlds. R is a binary relation on W . h is a function from W to
P(W ). A normal strict frame obeys the following constraints on h:
Strict Minimality. w ∈ h(w)
Strict Non-Vacuity. If R(w) ∩A , ∅ then h(w) ∩A , ∅.
The strict truth-conditions for the conditional are:
~ϕ > ψw= 1 i (h(w) ∩ ~ϕ) ⊆ ~ψ
All of our other clauses remain the same as before.
Consider:
Strict Indicative Constraint. If R(w) ∩ A , ∅ then for all
w′ ∈ R(w) : (h(w′) ∩A) ⊆ R(w)
Fact 3. QT is valid on a normal strict frame F i F meets the Strict
Indicative Constraint.
Proof.⇐ Again we split QT into QT⇐ and QT⇒. First we show QT⇒
cannot fail on a normal frame F . Suppose for contradiction it did.
Then, for some w, ~¬S¬ϕw = ~S(ϕ > ψ)w = 1 but ~S(ϕ ⊃ ψ)w = 0.
So, for some w′ ∈ R(w) : ~ϕw
′
= 1 but ~ψw
′
= 0. But, by Strict
Minimality, w′ ∈ h(w) ∩ ~ϕ. So ~ϕ > ψw
′
= 0 and ~S(ϕ > ψ)w = 0
after all, contradicting our initial supposition. So QT⇒ holds on any
the qualitative thesis 33
normal strict frame; and in particular it holds on any normal strict
frame that meets the Strict Indicative Constraint.
Now suppose that QT⇐ fails on a normal strict frame F . Then, for
some w, ~¬S¬ϕw = ~S(ϕ ⊃ ψ)w = 1 but ~S(ϕ > ψ)w = 0. So, for
some w′ ∈ R(w), ~ϕ > ψw
′
= 0. This means there is some w′′ ∈ h(w)∩
~ϕ such that w′′ < ~ψ. So w′′ < ~ϕ ⊃ ψ. But since ~S(ϕ ⊃ ψ)w it
follows R(w) ⊆ ~ϕ ⊃ ψ. So w′′ < R(w); the Strict Indicative Constraint
fails.
⇒: Suppose that the Strict Indicative Constraint does not hold on F .
Then for some A, there’s some w and w′ such that R(w) ∩ A , ∅,
w′ ∈ R(w) but f (A,w′) * R(w). So there’s some w′′ ∈ f (A,w) such
that w′′ < R(w). But now we can build a model where QT fails. Let
V (p) = A and V (q) = {w′′}. We can see that for all w′ ∈ R(w) ~p ⊃
¬qw
′
= 1, as w′′ < R(w). So ~S(p ⊃ q)w = 1. But ~p > qw
′
= 0, since
w′′ ∈ f (~p,w′). But w′ ∈ R(w), so ~S(p > q)w = 0. 
Fact 4. A normal strict frame F validates QT only if No Opposite
Materials holds on that frame.
Proof. Suppose, for contradiction, that on some normal strict frame F
QT holds but No Opposite Materials does not. Then there are w1 w2,
w3 andA such that (i) R(w1)∩A , ∅, R(w2)∩A , ∅ and R(w3)∩A , ∅
but (ii) for some C, R(w1) ⊆ A ⊃ C and R(w2) ⊆ A ⊃ ¬C. Since QT is
valid on F , F obeys the Strict Indicative Constraint. This means that
h(w3) ∩A ⊆ R(w1) and h(w3) ∩A ⊆ R(w2). So (h(w3) ∩A) ⊆ A ⊃ C
and (h(w3)∩A) ⊆ A ⊃ ¬C i.e. (h(w3)∩A) ⊆ C and (h(w3)∩A) ⊆ ¬C.
But this can only happen if h(w3)∩A = ∅. But this is already ruled out
by Strict Non-Vacuity. Contradiction. 
appendix b. the qualitative thesis in the shifty local
framework
Our languageL is as before. A shifty frame F forL is a tuple 〈W ,R, fκ〉.
fκ is a shifty selection function, a function from P(W ) to a selection
function. The other elements of the tuple are as before. A normal shifty
frame obeys the following constraints on fκ:
Success. fκ(w,A) ⊆ A
Minimality. If w ∈ A, then w ∈ fκ(w,A).
Non-Vacuity. If κ ∩A , ∅ then fκ(w,A) , ∅.
We recursively define truth at a world and a local context, i.e. a set
of worlds inW:
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~pκ,w= 1 i w ∈ V (p)
~¬ϕκ,w= 1 i ~ϕκ,w= 0
~ϕ ∧ ψκ,w= 1 i ~ϕκ,w=~ψκ,w= 1
~ϕ > ψκ,w= 1 i fκ(w,~ϕκ) ⊆ ~ψκ
~Sϕκ,w = 1 i ∀w′ ∈ R(w) : ~ϕR(w),w
′
= 1
where ~ϕκ = {w : ~ϕκ,w = 1}.
Recall the following property of shifty frames from section 7:
Localized Indicative Constraint. If A ∩ κ , ∅, then ∀w′ ∈ κ:
fκ(w′,A) ⊆ κ
We prove the following fact stated in the text:
Fact 14. If a normal monotonic shifty frame F obeys the Local Indica-
tive Constraint, then it validates QT.
Proof. Suppose the QT fails on a minimal monotonic shifty frame F .
Then for some κ and w, one of two cases obtains: i) ~¬S¬ϕκ,w= 1,
~S(ϕ > ψ)κ,w= 1 and ~S(ϕ ⊃ ψ)κ,w= 0; or ii) ~¬S¬ϕκ,w= 1, ~S(ϕ ⊃
ψ)κ,w= 1 and ~S(ϕ > ψ)κ,w= 0.
Case i) is ruled out by Minimality. For suppose i) obtains. Since
~S(ϕ > ψ)κ,w= 1, for all w′ ∈ R(w) : fR(w)(w′, ~ϕR(w)) ⊆ ~ψR(w).





= 0. But by Minimality, this w′ ∈ f (w′, ~ϕR(w)). So
~ψR(w),w
′
= 1 after all. Contradiction.
In case ii), the Local Indicative Constraint fails. Since ~¬S¬ϕκ,w= 1,
there is some w′ ∈ R(w) s.t. ~ϕR(w),w
′
= 1; so the antecedent of the Lo-
cal Indicative Constraint is satisfied when κ = R(w) and A = ~ϕR(w).





= 1. Since ~S(ϕ > ψ)κ,w= 0, there is some w′ ∈ R(w) such
that fR(w)(w′, ~ϕR(w)) * ~ψR(w). Since by Success fR(w)(w′, ~ϕR(w)) ⊆
~ϕR(w), it cannot be that fR(w)(w′, ~ϕR(w)) ⊆ R(w). So the Indicative
Constraint fails. 
Note that the Localized Indicative Constraint is not necessary for val-
idating QT: we only need the instances where κ = R(w) for some w.
But it seems to us that, from a semantic point of view, the more general
principle is the more natural one.
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